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INTRODUCTION
As a United States Congressman and a member of the Appropria-
tions Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, I
have had the good fortune to not only observe the scope, nature,
and process of environmental policymaking in the United States,
but also to compare it with other countries around the world. From
these experiences, I have found that the most compelling environ-
mental issue confronting us as we prepare to enter the twenty-first
century is our overly complex and burdensome system of federal,
state, and local environmental regulation. Our system, while devel-
oped with good intentions, has hamstrung our ability to clean up
our current ecological plight in a timely and cost-effective manner.
Worse, it poses a serious threat to future environmental protection
initiatives at a time when our financial resources to undertake them
will be strained as never before.
I. EFFECTIVE POLITICS AND SOUND SCIENCE: OFTEN AT ODDS
For over two hundred years, our democratic political system has
granted the public wide latitude to participate in the policymaking
process. And while not perfect, there is no better way than public
involvement to insure that the process is both fair and open. How-
ever, as the issues we face grow more complex, the public's ability
to understand the subtle nuances of the debate is invariably com-
promised and a rift develops between sound policy and effective
politics. As a result, sound bites often eclipse sound science as the
most effective tools in the policymaking process. For instance,
* Congressman Knollenberg is from the l1th Congressional District of
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until recently' the so-called "Delaney Clause"' required the Food
and Drug Administration to pursue a zero-tolerance policy for car-
cinogens in prepared foods and had been a fixture of U.S. policy
for almost four decades. On the surface, the Delaney Clause made
sense. After all, how could anyone condone the use of cancer-caus-
ing agents in the nation's food supply? But on closer examination,
its utility rang hollow. When the Delaney Clause was enacted in the
1950s, the testing methods of the day could usually detect carcino-
gens in the parts-per-thousand. In recent years, however, technolo-
gies developed that could detect them in the parts-per-trillion.4 At
that level, the term "carcinogenic" encompasses practically every
compound that poses the slightest risk of cancer.5 In fact, foods
like celery have naturally-occurring carcinogens in much greater
concentrations,6 yet the Delaney Clause made no distinction be-
tween these various carcinogens.7
Thus, from a purely scientific perspective, the Delaney Clause
was a severely flawed method of protecting food safety. A much
better policy is needed which will analyze peer-reviewed data on
the health risks associated with these various carcinogens, and set
standards on a case-by-case basis. However, as a policymaker, you
must be willing to pay the political price.
1. The 104th Congress enacted significant reforms to the Delaney Clause by
passing the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat.
1489 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
2. See 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1994).
3. See Robert Kaster, It's a Tough Competition for the Worst Regulation,
WASHINGTON TIMES, July 23, 1996.
4. Id. ("[w]hen [the] Delaney [Clause] was enacted, residues could only be
measured in parts per thousand. Now they can be measured in parts per trillion
and sometimes even in parts per quintillion.").
5. See Group Urges U.S. to Promote Science, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 9,
1997. The article states that "[the Delaney Clause] prohibited use, in processed
foods, of any substances that can cause the slightest risk of cancer at any concen-
tration." Id.
6. See William London & Ruth Kava, Be Thankful You're Not a Rat, PORT-
LAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 28, 1996 ("[elach year the American Council on Science
and Health publishes its Holiday Dinner menu, which shows that many, if not all,
mouthfuls of a traditional Thanksgiving feast contain 100-percent nonsynthetic,
all-natural, all organic carcinogenic chemicals . ..
7. See 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1994).
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For decades, proponents of Delaney Clause reform had to justify
why "[they] voted for carcinogens in [our] food supply"' or why
they introduced legislation that will allow "cancer-causing food
additives in our food supply."9 Thus, a seemingly simple fix to an
outdated policy was thwarted and its supporters maligned.
Often, our environmental policy suffers the same fate. As sound
bites continue to triumph over sound science, the public's ability to
perceive risk in a detached and objective manner becomes predis-
posed. Take, for instance, the American public's opinion toward
nuclear power. In 1979, the partial meltdown of reactor number
three at Three Mile Island gripped the entire nation, and soured
Americans to the environmental and safety benefits of nuclear
power."0 Indeed, the public's perception of it is best captured by
"The Simpsons" television show, whose depiction of a nuclear plant
is replete with flashing red "Warning" signs and glowing green
fluid oozing from the various pipes."1
8. Margaret E. Kriz, Poison Gamesmanship, NAT'L J., Apr. 18, 1992, at 931.
9. CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, HR 3200's ATTACK ON
FOOD SAFETY: GIVING FDA's ENFORCEMENT OF FOOD SAFETY LAWS TO OUT-
SIDE GROUPS (June 1996).
10. See James White, Baby-Bommers' Lives and Times: Recounting the Good,
the Bad, THE PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 1, 1996, at 5D.
11. In fact, nuclear power has proven to be a safe way to produce electricity,
especially when appropriate safety and licensing requirements are followed. Un-
like coal, natural gas, or oil, nuclear power plants do not emit noxious gases in-
cluding carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxide. See NUCLEAR ENERGY
INSTITUTE, ISSUE BRIEF: THE BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY: ENERGY SECURI-
TY, ENVTL. PROTECTION 1 (Feb. 1995). Even when the serious accident at Three
Mile occurred, no injuries or deaths resulted. See NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE,
ISSUE BRIEF: How Do WE KEEP NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SAFE? (Apr. 1995)
[hereinafter How Do WE KEEP NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SAFE?]. Due to multi-
ple barrier containment, "the accident at Three Mile Island ... the worst accident
in the history of U.S. commercial nuclear energy, caused an average exposure of
just 1.5 millirem to people within 50 miles of the plant- about what they would
get from a cross-country airplane flight." NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, RADIA-
TION: WE KNOW YOU HAVE QUESTIONS. HERE ARE SOME ANSWERS (Apr.
1995).
Conversely, when you do not have comprehensive safeguards, the result is
Chemobyl. The Chernobyl accident killed about thirty people and resulted in
many more injuries due to radiation exposure and bums. See How Do WE KEEP
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SAFE?, supra, at 1.
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II. FUNDAMENTAL FLAws IN OUR REGULATORY SCHEME:
EFFECTIVE POLITICS WITHOUT SOUND POLICY
Environmental policy suffers when sound science is subordinated
by political opportunism. At times, the real world impact of a poli-
cy crafted in this environment can be exactly the opposite of its
stated intentions. The Endangered Species Act' is a perfect exam-
ple. Current law, while intended to prevent extinction, in some
cases actually encourages landowners to destroy any natural habitat
and/or kill any endangered species that exist on their land out of
fear that the federal government will place restrictions on its use if
either the habitat or animal is discovered.' 3
In other cases, an overly-politicized process yields legislation so
ineffective that while billions of dollars are spent to remedy an
environmental problem, very little is ever accomplished. For in-
stance, the EPA's Comprehensive Environmental, Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act 4 ("CERCLA" or "Superfund") was
devised as a regulatory framework whereby the federal government
could recover from potentially responsible parties ("PRPs") the
costs of cleaning up the nation's toxic waste sites. However, in
practice, only a small amount of PRP expenditures actually is ap-
plied toward cleanup costs. For example, one report surveyed 666
corporations and found that thirty-three percent of their site expen-
ditures go towards legal expenses. 5 This figure increases to an
12. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
13. One commentator discusses the failure of the Endangered Species Act,
noting that
[t]he unintended result is that listed species become the landowner's
enemy, and habitat attractive to those species is often cleared or modi-
fied to keep the species away. Animals reportedly are even shot and
quietly buried. Given the perverse incentives created by the act, it is
not surprising that the Fish and Wildlife Service has only removed
twenty-four species from the list of endangered or threatened species,
and seven of twenty-four were delisted because they became extinct.
Richard L. Stroup, The Endangered Species Act in PERC POLICY SERIES:
REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTALISM IN THE. NEW ERA 8, 8-9 (Feb. 1995).
14. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
15. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND: LEGAL EXPENSES FOR
CLEANUP-RELATED ACTIVITIES OF MAJOR U.S. CORPORATIONS 4 (Dec. 1994).
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average of forty-four percent at "high-cost sites."'' 6 Additionally,
non-legal transaction costs siphon even more dollars away from
cleanup activities. 7 As a result, over 16.2 billion federal dollars"
have been spent over Superfund's sixteen-year existence, yet a 1995
report found that "[o]nly 291, or 24 percent, of the 1,238 'worst"'
Superfund sites have been cleaned up. 9
As a member of the Energy & Water Appropriations Subcommit-
tee, I have grappled with the Department of Energy's ("DOE")
Environmental Management ("EM") program. This program is
responsible for cleaning up our former nuclear defense production
facilities. 2' A costly legacy of the Cold War, the EM program has
a projected completion cost of anywhere from $227 billion2' to
$500 billion22 - which is larger than both the Marshall Plan and
the savings and loan bailout combined.
16. Id. at 25-26.
17. RAND CORPORATION, PRIVATE-SECTOR CLEAN-UP EXPENDITURES AND
TRANSACTIONS COSTS AT 18 SUPERFUND SITES 9-11 (1993). The study cites as
an example "engineering studies to characterize the waste at a site are [character-
ized as] transactional if their purpose is to assist in the search for ... another
PRP ...."
18. EPA, Office of Congressional and Legislative Affairs, Superfund FY
1981-FY 1998 (on file with the author). According to this report, the federal
government has spent $16,258,600,000 from fiscal year 1981 through fiscal year
1996. Id. The funding level for Superfund for fiscal year 1997 was
$1,394,200,000. Id. This figure does not include state, local or private expendi-
tures for Superfund sites.
19. THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, ISSUES '96 125 (1996) [hereinafter ISSUES
'961; see also Michael G. Oxley, Superfund: Getting it Right in COMMON SENSE
90 (Nat'l Pol'y F. ed., 1995).
20. See generally THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CLEANING UP THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX (May 1994).
21. DOE, OFFICE OF ENVTL. MANAGEMENT, THE 1996 BASELINE ENVTL.
MANAGEMENT REPORT 4-4 fig. 4.2 (June 1996) [hereinafter 1996 BASELINE
REPORT].
22. DOE, OFFICE OF ENVTL. MANAGEMENT, ESTIMATING THE COLD WAR
MORTGAGE-THE 1995 BASELINE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT REPORT XVI
fig.4 Vol. 1 (Mar. 1995) [hereinafter 1995 BASELINE REPORT]. The report does
state that the $500 billion estimate represents a "scenario... which is not
achievable at all sites with today's technology." Id.
23. See Paul Glastris, The Bipartisanship Diversion, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Dec. 23, 1996, at 37 (commenting that the S&L bailout "cost taxpayers
more than $130 billion"); Mathis Chazanov, UN-OA U Envoy Says Prospects for
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While less well known than Superfund, the EM program is equal-
ly paralyzed from the constraints imposed by a politicized
policymaking process. In the abstract, it would seem that solutions
to a problem as unique as this would be directed by a tailor-made
regulatory system. Not so. Instead, it is regulated by a maze of
haphazardly-layered and often conflicting statutes, including:
CERCLA, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 197624;
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 19865; De-
fense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board26; National Environmental
Policy Act27; Toxic Substances Control Ace8; Air Quality and
Emission Limitations29; Water Pollution Prevention and Control
Act3; Atomic Energy Act"; Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation
Control Act 2; Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act3 ; and
Hazardous Materials Transportation Ace 4; plus any and all appli-
cable state and local regulations.
As a result, the DOE and their contractors must spend a large
amount of their resources decoding an impenetrable regulatory
behemoth instead of furthering their goals of stabilizing, treating
and storing radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste.
Just how much of our resources are diverted from cleanup to
regulatory compliance? To answer this, I have found it very helpful
to divide the current EM workforce into one of three categories.
First are those workers who are directly involved in accomplishing
cleanup or waste treatment in the field. Their responsibilities in-
Peace in Central Africa Slim, ASSOCIATED PREss, Jan. 28, 1997 ("[tlhe original
Marshall Plan cost the United States $13 billion").
24. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994).
25. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.(1994)).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 2286 (1994).
27. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
28. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994).
29. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994). This provision is also.known as the
Clean Air Act.
30. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). This provision is also known as the
Clean Water Act.
31. See 23 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297g-4 (1994).
32. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7942 (1994).
33. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021 b-j (1994).
34. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5127 (1994).
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clude decontamination and decommissioning, deactivation, ground-
water and soil remediation, and waste treatment. They often must
wear head-to-toe protective gear including a respirator. I call these
people "space suits." Second are workers involved in direct support
of field activities, such as supervision, laboratory analysis, environ-
mental monitoring, safety and health, waste characterization, safe-
guards and security, and waste monitoring. These people tend to
wear lab coats; thus, I have designated them "lab coats." Finally are
workers in support services such as human resources, financial
management, legal and administrative support, and information
services. I have designated them "business suits. 35
Five major sites make up seventy percent of the total costs allo-
cated for EM.36 According to DOE, in 1995 the percentage of its
workforce devoted to "space suits" activities at the five sites were
as follows: In Hanford, Wash., thirty-eight percent; Idaho, thirty-
two percent; Oak Ridge, Tenn., sixty-seven percent; Rocky Flats,
Colo., seventeen percent; and Savannah River, S.C., fifty-four per-
cent.37 Alternatively, the percentage of workforce devoted to "busi-
ness suits" activities for fiscal year 1995 were: In Hanford, twenty-
six percent; Idaho, nineteen percent; Oak Ridge, twenty-two per-
cent; Rocky Flats, forty-nine percent; and Savannah River, fourteen
percent.3" The remaining percentage consists of "lab coats."39
At first glance, it appears about twenty-five percent of the
workforce is made up of employees who come to work in business
suits. However, this number does not include the number of "busi-
ness suits" that work at the Washington, D.C. headquarters.
Even without considering the hundreds of EM employees in
Washington, D.C., why would we need twenty-six "business suits"
for every thirty-eight who are actually doing the cleanup activities
at the Hanford site. In Rocky Flats, why would we need forty-nine
"business suits" for as few as seventeen "space suits?" I submit that
35. DOE uses the terms "mission direct," "functional support," and "support
services" to define their workforce. The employees under these titles should
match "spacesuits," "lab coats," and "business suits" respectively.
36. 1996 BASELINE REPORT, supra note 21 (tbl. preceding i).
37. OFFICE OF BUDGET, OFFICE OF ENVTL. MANAGEMENT, DEP'T OF ENERGY,
ENVTL. MANAGEMENT FTES AND COSTS 3 (Mar. 1996).
38. Id. at 2.
39. Id. at 3.
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overregulation is the cause of these disproportionate and inefficient
hiring practices.
III. OUR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: COLLAPSING UNDER ITS OWN
WEIGHT
In the future, the negative consequences of an environmental
policy that forsakes sound science for political expediency are
bound to worsen. The reasons are clear. First, its inefficiency and
counterproductivity are taking an increasing toll on our economic
competitiveness. Second, our current regulatory scheme is unsus-
tainable due to fiscal constraints.
Regulations come with a high price tag. Regulations cost approx-
imately three times as much as they did in 1970.' In 1995, the to-
tal cost of complying with federal regulations (a large part of which
are environmental) was $668 billion or roughly ten percent of the
Gross Domestic Product; by the year 2000, it is projected to in-
crease to $721 billion.4 This figure does not even include the
costs of compliance for state and local regulations. In comparison,
personal income taxes only cost Americans $533 billion in 1995.42
Certainly, I do not argue for the elimination of all environmental
regulations. My experience at Chernobyl left me with a stark pic-
ture of what happens when a country with a weak economy fails to
consider environmental consequences. Morale is low and funding
levels are at times nonexistent. Moreover, a recent article described
a former Soviet naval graveyard where idle ships and submarines
are anchored in harbors and where "metal containers of spent nu-
clear fuel [lie].... The containers are corroded, their lids are
cracked and water flows in and out."'43 This current environmental
condition is in addition to "[d]ecades of dumping radioactive waste
40. See HALEY BARBOUR, AGENDA FOR AMERICA: A REPUBLICAN DIRECTION
FOR THE FUTURE 19 (Nat'l Pol'y F. ed., Regnery Pub. 1996).
41. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, THE CHANG-
ING BURDEN OF REGULATION, PAPERWORK, AND TAx COMPLIANCE ON SMALL
BUSINESS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 27 (Oct. 1995).
42. Perspective-Regulation, The Hidden Tax, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Oct.
7, 1996, at B I.
43. Fred Barbash, Nuclear Specter Rises From Naval Graveyard; Old Soviet
Base Harbors Risk of Catastrophe, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1996, at Al (cit-
ing a recent study by the Norwegian environmental organization Bellona).
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into the sea."'
Fortunately, in the United States the inverse is true - we have a
strong economy with many regulations. However, to argue for regu-
latory reform is an uphill battle. Regulations by their very nature
are hidden from the consumer. And the consumer is often left in
the dark about how regulation affects their budgets. Initially, regu-
latory cost is borne by business. Business in turn passes on this cost
to the consumer. Indications abound that overzealous regulation
reduces business efficiency, slows economic growth, and causes
real wages to fall.45 For example, federal and state regulations in-
crease the sticker price on a car by an estimated $2,000." In all,
environmental regulations cost the American family almost $1,800
per year.47
Small business is hit hardest by federal regulation. Mark
Isakowitz of the National Federation of Independent Business noted
that there is
growing bipartisan agreement about two phenomena that are taking
place in America's small business sector. Number one, virtually all
job growth in this country comes from small business. And num-
ber two, the burden created by federal regulations falls predomi-
nately and disproportionately on the very people we rely on to
create these jobs.'
Moreover, small business is less equipped to comply with each
and every regulation. As we move into the twenty-first century
we must move away from the perception that regulations only
affect businesses like General Motors, McDonalds, and DOW
Chemical. The local cleaner and hardware store and eventually
the economy as a whole will have to bear this burden as well.
Also, it is important to note that our environmental policy is
not immune from budgetary realities. As entitlements like Social
Security and Medicare consume larger amounts of our total bud-
get, discretionary spending will be squeezed. In 1995,
44. Id.
45. See ISSUES '96, supra note 19, at 91-92 fig. 4.
46. BARBOUR, supra note 40, at 19.
47. ISSUES '96, supra note 19, at 110.
48. BARBOUR, supra note 40, at 20 (citing testimony before the House Small
Business Committee on July 28, 1993).
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entitlements consumed approximately 51.4% of our federal bud-
get.' If you include mandatory interest payments on the national
debt, the amount of true mandatory spending equals sixty-six
percent.50 Discretionary spending consumed the remaining thirty-
four percent" of which just under one-third ($174 billion) is for
environmental protection."
When you combine current fiscal and economic trends, discre-
tionary funding will continue to be reduced each year. By the
year 2002 it is projected under current policy that entitlement
spending plus interest payments will account for seventy-two
percent of budget outlays. 3 Discretionary spending will have to
decrease accordingly.
One can just imagine the juggling act required to balance the
budget and provide for a national defense, a sound environment,
a national infrastructure, and an education for our children.
Therefore, there is a great incentive to reduce our regulatory bur-
den now. I believe by simplifying our regulatory scheme and
reducing the cost of compliance, we will be able to stretch envi-
ronmental protection dollars further while maintaining sound
environmental policy.
IV. SOLUTIONS WE CAN IMPLEMENT TO IMPROVE OUR
NATION'S ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY SCHEME
Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of our nation's environmen-
tal scheme is that even after complying with all the paperwork re-
quirements and fighting our way through the legal system, the
amount of actual cleanup we have accomplished is de minimis.
49. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUT-
LOOK: FISCAL YEARS 1997-2006 42 tbl. 2-5 (May 1996) [hereinafter FISCAL
YEARS 1997-2006]. This figure is calculated by dividing the $822 billion of
"mandatory spending" with the total federal budget of $1.6 trillion.
50. Id. This figure is the $822 billion in mandatory spending plus $232 billion
in interest payments divided by $1.6 trillion.
51. Id. This figure is $546 billion divided by the $1.6 trillion budget.
52. See JOHN SHANAHAN, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, HOW TO TALK
ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENT 3 (Sept. 6, 1996).
53. FISCAL YEARS 1997-2006, supra note 49, at 42 tbl. 2-5. This'figure is
$1.29 trillion of mandatory spending plus $311 billion of interest payments divid-
ed by the $2.21 trillion federal budget.
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After all, is our goal to cleanup the former nuclear defense facili-
ties no matter what the cost or is it to make the environment safe
for all Americans? In my opinion, the latter is the only course to
take.
With a common sense, sound science approach, we could eradi-
cate wasteful spending, and inefficient, overburdensome regula-
tion. Ideas like cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, and peer
review should be the backbone of every regulation. Unfortunate-
ly, our environmental policy has decided it is best to chase every
last fluorocarbon, regardless of cost.
Cost-benefit analysis would allow us to choose policy that
maximizes outcome realized by America as a whole. For exam-
ple, it costs over thirty-three billion dollars per year to save one
life due to radionuclide emission control at uranium fuel cycle
facilities. 4 Just think of what one-half or one-third of this mon-
ey would do for cancer or AIDS research. Such regulations would
fail the cost-benefit analysis. A similar analysis was used when
the nation decided not to add seat belts to school buses due to the
enormous costs and the relatively few casualties in school bus
accidents.5
DOE estimates the EM program will cost $227 billion and will
not be finished until after the year 2066.56 Other recent estimates
predict a cost that could potentially reach $500 billion.5 7 It is not
certain what percentage of these costs goes toward complying
with federal regulations. However, a reoccurring question is: How
clean is clean? In setting their standard, the EPA assumes that
young children will consume 100-200 milligrams of contaminated
soil per day every day for 350 days. 8 Clearly this approach is
impracticable.
We could save Americans tens of billions of dollars by bring-
54. See ISSUES '96, supra note 19, at 87.
55. See National Schoolbus Safety Act, H.R. 1815, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1987); see also Charles E. Begley & Andrea K. Biddle, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Safety Belts in Texas School Buses, 103 PUB. HEALTH REP., Sept. 1988, at 479-
85.
56. 1996 BASELINE REPORT, supra note 21, at tbl. 4-4.
57. 1995 BASELINE REPORT, supra note 22, at XVI.
58. Wayne T. Brough, Superfund Unplugged, in CITIZENS FOR A SOUND
ECONOMY FOUNDATION: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 8 (Aug. 11, 1995).
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ing common sense to this extreme position. Instead of making the
former nuclear defense facilities into playgrounds where hungry
children would apparently eat the soil, we could turn the sites
into industrial zones or, alternatively, into non-residential recre-
ational areas.
Risk assessment is another important consideration. Though
similar to cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment focuses on the
risk of harm compared to the benefit incurred. Again, all environ-
mental regulations should be based on sound science and risk
should be assessed according to the level of harm threatened. The
expectation that such harm will actually occur, balanced against
the cost to reasonably reduce the harm to safe levels, cannot be
ignored. The "crisis" mentality disregards this notion, setting its
sight on zero-risk.
Zero-risk is unattainable. The natural state of our environment
is not at zero-risk levels. Most radioactivity exists naturally. In
fact, the earth's atmosphere, the air we breathe, the water we
drink, the soil we walk on, and the food we eat, accounts for
eighty-two percent of the average American's annual dose of
radiation. 9 Seventeen percent comes from medical X-rays, other
medical tests, and from consumer products like color televisions
or watches with illuminated dials.' The remaining one-half of a
percent is from other sources, including uranium mining, the
former nuclear defense sites, nuclear reactors, or nuclear fall-
out.6
Last is peer-reviewed sound science. As each new environmen-
tal issue bubbles to the top, a whirlwind of numbers, examples,
counter examples, and more numbers are hurled around. With
peer-reviewed science, the dust will be able to settle. Naturally,
there will continue to be the battle of statistics, but common
sense will not be turned on its head.
59. See DOE, PACIFIC NORTHWEST LABORATORY, HANFORD: YOuR ENVI-
RONMENT AND YOUR HEALTH 8 (Sept. 1995). This figure represents 300 millirem
divided by 365 millirem (the total U.S. national average for yearly radiation
exposure).
60. Id. This figure is 63 millirem divided by the total 365 millirem.
61. Id. This figure is 2 millirem divided by the total 365 millirem.
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V. REGULATORY REFORM AND THE CREATION OF A SAFER AND
CLEANER ENVIRONMENT FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AND
BEYOND
I believe we have an excellent opportunity on this eve of the
twenty-first century to reform our regulations and truly educate
the public. However, we must be cognizant of the regulation's
effects which we have dismissed for too long. Moving toward
common sense approaches like cost-benefit analysis, risk assess-
ment, and peer-reviewed sound science is necessary. And while I
believe a sound economy and environment can coexist, overregu-
lation threatens both.
I do not advocate the complete elimination of environmental
regulations. Some environmental regulations are needed to pro-
vide a credible way to monitor the quality and safety of our ecol-
ogy. However, inherent in a pro-environment regulatory scheme
should be flexibility and local control, not the one-size-fits-all
approach dominated by sound bites and effective politics.
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